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CLAIMS ARISING FROM COMPENSABLE INJURIES
TO LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WORKERS:
A TANGLED TRIAD OF REMEDIES*
THE Longshoremen's and Harbor Vorkers' Compensation Act established
a system of compensation for maritime injuries which balances the interests
of both workers and employers more rationally than did the case law rules of
tort liability.' The act requires the employer, usually a stevedoring contractor,
to pay compensation even when he might not have been liable for negligence.2
On the other hand, by limiting the employer's responsibility in all cases to an
amount specified in the act, it decreases his liability in those cases in which
previously he would have been answerable for negligence.3 An injured em-
ployee retains his right to hold third parties, usually the owner of the ship on
which he was injured, liable in damages, even after the employer has volun-
*Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956) ; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952), as amended, Pub. L. No. 803,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26, 1956). Representative Graham (Pa.) described the aims of
the act as:
".. . to take out of litigation the vexatious conditions and defenses that interfered
with the prosecution of claims of workmen injured in their work . . . to equitably
adjust all misfortunes attendant upon the work of any particular industry, and to
put the burden of bearing that upon the industry, with an equitable adjustment of
compensation."
68 CoNr. REc. 5410 (1927). The shifts in harbor workers' status prior to the act are
complex. The benefits available under state workmen's compensation acts had been ex-
tended to harbor workers injured aboard ship until Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 217 (1917) held this application of the state statutes destructive of the uniformity
in maritime matters intended by the Constitution. Congress, thereafter, twice amended
the "saving to suitors' clause" of the Judiciary Act to include maritime workers within
the scope of the state acts, Act of Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 STAT. 395, Act of June 10, 1922,
c. 216, 42 STAT. 634, but both attempts were held unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W. C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). Harbor workers were thereupon held entitled to the
benefits of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1952) giving to seamen an action at law against their employers for negligence and
modifying the employer's common law defenses. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
272 U.S. 50 (1926). See RolrsoN, ADMIRALTY § 39 (1939). The passage of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in 1927 in effect nullified this ex-
tension. See note 3 infra and accompanying text. See also, for analysis of these shifts in
harbor workers' status, Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights of Harbor
Workers, 39 CORXELL L.Q. 381, 403-07 (1954) ; Comment, The Tangled Seine: A Survey
of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243 (1947).
2. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1952).
3. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 904-10 (1952). See, e.g., New York Cent.
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203-04 (1917).
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tarily commenced compensation payments.4 But, to preclude double recovery.
compensation ceases if the employee so elects.' If the employee receives com-
pensation under a formal award, his third-party cause of action is assigned to
his employer.' From any third-party recovery the employer recoups his cost
of prosecuting the suit and the amount he is bound to pay the injured em-
ployee under the formal award of compensation; any excess is paid to the
employee. 7 Since the employer is usually better able financially to prosecute
the suit, compensation under a formal award often works to the advantage of
the employee. And, through the right of subrogation, the employer is safe-
guarded against compensating an employee for injuries primarily attributable
to the negligence of others.
Three Supreme Court cases, however, have substantially altered the balance
of interests effected by the act. The first, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
s
significantly increased the extent of shipowners' liability to longshoremen.
Sieracki included longshoremen within the protection of an owner's absolute
and nondelegable duty to provide "seamen" a seaworthy ship,9 and its rationale
has been used to include other harbor workers as well.' 0 Hence a nonnegligent
4. 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (a) (1952) ; American Stevedores, Inc. v.
Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 454-55 (1947) ; Jordan v. District of Columbia, 116 F. Supp. 559
(D.D.C. 1953). The act covers only employees injured while working on navigable waters
of the United States. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1952).
5. 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1952); The Owen, 43 F. Supp. 897, 899
(E.D. Pa. 1942) ; cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 542 (1933). See also
Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 529 (1936) (employee who commences, but later ter-
minates, suit may then obtain compensation if his conduct has not prejudiced the employer's
right of subrogation) ; American Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lowe, 70 F.2d 616, 618
(2d Cir. 1934) (same).
6. 52 STAT. 1168 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1952). For definition of a formal award
see 44 STAT. 1435 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 919(c)-(e) (1952) ; Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d
127, 128-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945) ; Toomey v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
123 F.2d 718,721 (2d Cir. 1941).
Under the act as originally passed a formal award was not a condition precedent to an
assignment; if an employee accepted voluntary compensation the third-party cause of
action vested in the employer. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
§ 33(b), c. 505, 44 STAT. 1440 (1927).
7. 52 STAT. 1168 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1952).
8. 328U.S. 85 (1946).
9. Id. at 94; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99, 100, 102 (1944) ; Carlisle
Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922). For a critical discussion of these
characteristics of the seaworthiness doctrine see Tetreault, supra note 1, at 391-403.
10. Pope & Talbott, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953) (carpenter repairing
unloading equipment). But see Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 238 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1956) (refusing inclusion of workman repairing "shaft keyway" because such not
ship's work).
"Seaworthiness" is a term of art. Any inadequacy, under ordinary circumstances, of
the ship's equipment, appliances or personnel will render it unseaworthy. Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946) (equipment and appliances) ; Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944) (same) ; Boudin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336,
339 (1955) (personnel) ; Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir.),
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owner may become liable to a maritime worker for a ship's unseaworthiness
even if the defect was caused by a negligent employer. The shipowner, there-
upon, may be forced to pay damages to an injured employee and, in effect,
repay to the negligent employer that which he had expended in compensa-
tion."
Shipowners have reacted to this increased responsibility by attempting to
shift the burden of damages recovered by injured longshoremen to concur-
rently negligent employers. Precluded from obtaining any contribution from
joint tortfeasors,'12 they have relied upon contractual 13 and quasi-contractual
indemnity. 14 Contractual indemnity presupposes an express or implied agree-
ment between contracting parties that the promisor will save the promisee
harmless from damages resulting from the former's improper performance of.
the contract. Although express contracts of indemnity are not inconsistent
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (same). Recently the unseaworthiness doctrine has been
applied to defects in equipment brought on board by and kept under the control of the
employer. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirming 205 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1953) ; Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954), reversing 205 F.2d 57
(3d Cir. 1953).
11. Pope & Talbott, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953). The Court reasoned
that a contrary result would frustrate the employer's statutory prerogative of reimburse-
ment and constitute a species of contribution barred by Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). See also Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, supra note 10; Rogers
v. United States Lines, supra note 10.
12. The leading case, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285-87 (1952),
was predicated on the absence of an established right to contribution among joint tort-
feasors in maritime, non-collision cases; the Court concluded that an extension of con-
tribution would be better effected by Congress. Lower federal courts had previously as-
sumed that contribution was available in admiralty, but differed as to the effect of the
exclusive liability clause of the act. E.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182
F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1950) (contribution barred because act relieved employer from
common liability to injured employee); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574, 589 (N.D.
Cal. 1947) (contribution permitted because based on relationship between shipowner and
employer). For a detailed review of federal cases see Weinstock, The Employer's Duty
to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 321, 323-28 (1954) ; see also state cases collected in Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 959 (1956).
13. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); Brown v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Barber S.S. Lines Inc. v. Quinn Bros.,
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1952).
14. Quasi-contractual indemnification is a responsibility imposed by law, independent
of, contract, upon an active wrongdoer to indemnify a passive wrongdoer- when each is
liable to the same third party. Shipowners have generally been denied recovery on this
theory, since the necessary liability of the active wrongdoer, the employer, to the third
party, the employee, has been negated by the act. Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d
134, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951); Peak Drilling Co. v. Haliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368, 370-71 (10th Cir. 1954); Brown v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1954) ; American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Mat-
thews, 182 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1950). Contra, United States v. Rothschild Int'l Steve-
doring Co., 183 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Babnick v. The Mount Athos, 122 F. Supp.
68, 73 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
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with the act,1 they are not customary; and employers consistently argue that
the act precludes implied indemnity. 6 For implying a contract of indemnity
subjects the employer, without his consent, to liability to injured employees
in excess of compensation which the act prescribes as the extent of his re-
sponsibility. 17
The second case, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,'8
rejected this argument and allowed a shipowner to recover from the employer
on the theory of implied indemnity. An injured stevedore had elected to sue
the shipowner for negligence rather than to recover compensation from his
employer. Losing the suit to the employee, the shipowner sought to recover
from the employer the amount it had paid." The Supreme Court decided that
the employer's negligence in stowing cargo was a breach of its consensual
"warranty of workmanlike service"20 and that the resulting damage, the in-
jured employee's judgment against the shipowner, was a foreseeable conse-
quence of the breach.21 Because the employer's liability was said to be based
upon breach of contract with the shipowner, not upon negligence to the em-
ployee, the Court rejected the employer's claim to statutory immunity.2 2 The
Court also rejected the employer's contention that the shipowner's failure to
discover and correct the improper stowage barred indemnification.2 3 Although
even an express contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify one
against his own negligence unless such an intention is stated in unequivocal
terms, 24 the decision on this issue is in accord with a recognized exception
allowing recovery when the indemnitee's negligence is merely the failure to
discover and correct the consequences of the indemnitor's improper perform-
ance.
23
15. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 457 (1947) ; United States v.
Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904 (1949) ;
Green v. War Shipping Administrator, 66 F. Supp. 393, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) ; Weinstock,
supra note 12, at 331., 332.
16. See Weinstock, supra note 12, at 336-46.
17. See note 3 supra and accompanying text; Brief for Petitioner for Writ of
Certiorari, p. 10, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
18. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See Notes, 36 B.U.L. REv. 312 (1956), 25 FORDHAn'I L. REV.
174 (1956) ; The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REv. 83, 149; 3 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 669 (1956).
19. 350 U.S. at 127.
20. Id. at 133.
21. Id. at 130.
22. Id. at 131-32.
23. Id. at 134.
24. Rice v. Pennsylvania R.R., 202 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Sinclair Prairie Oil
Co. v. Thornley, 127 F.2d 128, 133 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen, 74 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1935).
25. Ryan appears to be the first case so holding since the exception was expressed by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Boston Woven-Hose and Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232,
59 N.E. 657 (1901) and approved in Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196




Ryan restores a measure of equilibrium to a situation weighted against the
shipowner by Sieracki, by his inability to obtain contribution, and by em-
ployers' immunity under the act. It imposes upon employers, however, the
same liability against which they were to be insulated by the act. Despite the
technical niceties of the Court's position, the employer, through the ship-
owner, pays damages to an injured employee, although the act says that only
compensation, limited in amount, shall be required.26
A practical effect of Ryan, moreover, is to devalue employees' statutory
remedy against third-party tortfeasors. An employer, foreseeing a shipowner's
claim to indemnity because of the employer's improper performance 2 7 could
force the employee to a formal award. 28 The act then vests the employee's
third-party cause of action in the employer and thereby permits the employer,
against whom the cause of action may ultimately be directed, to prosecute the
suit ineffectively or even to elect not to prosecute.2 9 The Supreme Court, fac-
ing this result in Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud,30 attempted to restore
26. The recovery in Ryan was $75,000. Compensation and costs which the employer
would be entitled to recoup totaled $12,797.36. 350 U.S. at 127. The maximum compen-
sation allowable under the act is $17,280. Pub. L. No. 803, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26,
1956).
27. Several commentators have suggested disclaimers. See 44 CALIF. L. REv. 800, 804
(1956) ; 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 174, 177 (1956). However, the employer's bargaining posi-
tion probably does not permit him, in a contract of service with a shipowner, to avoid the
liability imposed by the decision.
28. Once an employee has filed a claim, the employer can easily obtain a final award.
See 44 STAT. 1435 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 919(a)-(c) (1952); note 6 supra. Admittedly,
the employee could fail to file a claim and sue the shipowner directly. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the employee will make this election; if the suit against the shipowner is un-
successful, he will have forfeited his right to compensation from the employer. Chapman
v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 529 (1936) (action by employee which would prejudice employer's
subrogation rights against a third party would discharge the employer). Further, the in-
jured employee's financial status is probably not such that he could elect not to file a claim.
29. If compensation after an award is paid by an insurance company, the latter is
subrogated to the employer's assigned right of action against the shipowner. 52 STAT. 1168
(1938), 33 U.S.C. § 933(i) (1952). Compensation policies are normally written to cover
employers impleaded by third parties against whom suit has been brought by an employee.
Letter from Sidney A. Schwartz, counsel to Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., to the Yale Law
Journal, Nov. 9, 1956, on file in Yale Law Library. Insurance companies, therefore, are
subject to the same conflict of interests as employers.
Ryan, moreover, spells the end of most employer's subsidies to employees conducting
third-party suits, since to continue this practice would involve sponsoring lawsuits against
themselves. 350 U.S. at 144 (dissenting opinion).
30. 351 U.S. 525 (1956). Czaplicki, longshoreman, had obtained a formal compensa-
tion award. His employer's insurer had paid the award, thereby becoming subrogated to
the employee's causes of action against a marine contracting company and the shipowner,
the former for negligence and the latter for negligence and unseaworthiness. The insurer
did not move against the contracting company which it had insured. Nor did it move
against the shipowner, since under the Ryan case, the latter might have a right over against
the employer, which it had also insured. Czaplicki then sued, inter alia, the shipowner
and the contracting company, contending that the formal compensation award did not con-
stitute an effective assignment of his causes of action.
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to the employee his statutory prerogative. The decision, however, is predicated
upon ambiguous grounds and, regardless of how interpreted, fails to revitalize
fully the employee's pre-Ryan position.
Czaplicki held that an injured employee could independently maintain a
third-party suit after accepting compensation under a formal award 31 if he
were "the only person with sufficient adverse interest to bring suit. '3 2 The
Court, however, stated ".. . all that we hold is that, given the conflict of inter-
ests and inaction by the assignee, the employee should not be relegated to any
rights he may have against the assignee, but can maintain the third-party
action himself. ' 33 However, if the employer's inaction is a condition precedent
to the employee's suit, the employer can retain complete control of the suit,
despite any conflict of interests, and fail to prosecute it effectively. And, be-
cause the admiralty courts are open to him, 4 he may so conduct it that the
employee cannot intervene.35
In addition, even if the employee's capacity to maintain the third-party suit
depends only upon a conflict of interests in the employer, the employer may
nevertheless forestall the suit by compromising with the shipowner soon after
31. The Supreme Court's holding overturned a considerable body of contrary reason-
ing in the federal courts. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 540 (1933)
(act intended to effect a complete transfer of the cause of action) ; Moore v. Hechinger,
127 F.2d 746, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (once compensation is accepted under an award the
employee has no claim or right against any person responsible for his injury) ; Johnsen v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1938) (once employee has made
a binding election he has no further control over the third-party suit) ; Moore v. Christien-
sen S.S. Co., 53 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1931) (upon payment of compensation employer alone
can maintain third-party action) ; Hunt v. Bank Line, Ltd., 35 F.2d 136, 137 (4th Cir.
1929) (employee electing compensation has no further control over third-party suit,
despite his interest in the proceeds) ; The Kokusai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 44 F.2d 659,
660 (S.D. Tex. 1930) (employee's suit after assignment permitted only after employer's
fraudulent refusal to sue). The Court's construction of the act, however, is not a repudia-
tion of congressional intent, but is validated by a self-evident statutory pre-supposition that
the interests of the assignee and employee would not be in conflict. Cf. The Etna, 138
F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1943) ; The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HAgv. L. Rp,. 83, 150.
32. 351 U.S. at 531.
33. Id. at 532. (Emphasis added.)
34. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (191.7) ; Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Im-
brovek, 234 U.S. 52, 60 (1914) ; Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 99 (3d Cir.
1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
35. Admiralty courts have jurisdiction over maritime torts in personam as well as in
rem. See Munro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) *473, *486 (1825); Czaplicki v; The
Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 527 (1956) (action in personam and in rem for alleged
negligence and unseaworthiness); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 97 (1944)
(liability in personam for unseaworthiness). See also ADmtmALTY Rurz 15 (restricting
suits for assault or beating to actions in personam). Third parties may not intervene in
in personam admiralty proceedings. ADmiRALTY RuLEs 34, 42; The Oregon, 158 U.S.
186, 210 (1895) ; Geotechnical Corp. v. Pure Oil Co., 196 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952) ; Defense Plant Corp. v. United States Barge Lines, 145 F.2d
766,767 (2d Cir. 1944).
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the formal award. 36 A settlement is often likely, since each party can benefit
by compromise. The employer's maximum return under an assignment of
the employee's claim is limited by statute to compensation and costs, and is
thus the same from both compromise and damage action ;37 but the employer
may lose much more in a suit than by compromise, since he always has some
risk of liability on an implied indemnity. The shipowner, aware of this weak-
ness in the employer's bargaining position, will usually be able to obtain a
relatively small settlement. The settlement will then bar the employee from
suing the shipowner under the Czaplicki doctrine,8 unless the court finds that
an "adverse interest" is a prerequisite to a valid compromise, as it was in
Czaplicki to the employer's right to prosecute an action against the shipowner.
If the employer were liable to the shipowner as an indemnitor, he would cer-
tainly lack a sufficient adverse interest. But even under this rationale, the
employee would probably be forced to litigate the complex and as yet undefined
issue of indemnity under Ryan,3 9 a question only peripheral to his damage
action.
The statutory balance of liability could be preserved by eliminating the ship-
owner's liability to longshoremen for unseaworthiness when the defect arose
solely through the employer's failure to perform properly.40 Eliminating the
shipowner's liability in this situation would restore to the employer most of
36. After the assignment effected by a formal award the act permits the employer to
compromise without the employee's consent. 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(d)
(1952).
37. 52 STAT. 1168 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1952).
38. The Court, in Ccaplicki, specifically declined to characterize the assignee as a
fiduciary. 351 U.S. at 532. See Title G. & T. Co. v. Mortgage Comm'n, 273 N.Y. 415,
426, 7 N.E.2d 841, 846 (1937) (in case of assignment there is no fiduciary relationship
between assignor and assignee) ; 1, ScoTT, TRUSTS 152, 154 (1956) (same). Since the act
permits the employer to compromise the third-party claim without the consent of the
employee, it is doubtful that Congress intended a fiduciary relationship. 44 STAT. 1440
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(d) (1952). But see United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v.
United States, 152 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1945) (assignee under the act is, in effect, a trus-
tee who "must not . . . entirely disregard the employee's interest"), endorsed by the dis-
senting opinion in Czaplicki, 351 U.S. at 535. Should the assignee be considered a fidu-
ciary, any compromise made in which his possible liability as indemnitor was a factor
would seem a breach of trust for which he would be held responsible to the employee. See
2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1508 (1956).
39. In Connolly v. Weyerhauser S.S. Co., 236 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1956), for instance,
the majority found Ryan inapplicable because the employee's injury was not a foreseeable
consequence of the employer's negligence; the dissenting opinion thought Ryan control-
ling because the shipowner's intervening negligence, although active and unforeseeable,
was not a proximate cause of the injury. In Seawright v. A. Garcia Y Cia., 138 F. Supp.
881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1956), the court reasoned that the jury, having found shipowner neg-
ligent, must determine on remand: whether his negligence was primary or secondary;
whether it was active or passive; and the relationship of his negligence to employer's con-
duct, in order to find legal cause.
40. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
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the immunity granted by the act.41 And since this immunity abrogates the
employer's conflict of interests, such a partial repeal of the Sieracki doctrine
would also abrogate his incentive to impede the employee's third-party suit
for unseaworthiness.4
A more realistic solution would repeal the Sieracki rationale entirely and
deny the application of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen. Long-
shoremen, who board a ship only in port and never venture to sea, are subject
to totally different conditions, and do not need the protection granted to sea-
men of an absolute liability rule.43 Shipowners should therefore be liable to
longshoremen only for negligence. This was the extent of liability of third
parties to longshoremen when the act was passed,44 and, presumably, an action
for negligence was the only type of third-party claim which the act intended
to preserve. If the Sieracki doctrine were rejected,4 5 the tendency of the Ryan
41. For the single situation in which the employer could still be held liable for neg-
ligence under Ryan, see text at note 46 infra.
42. The employee, however, would have a heavier trial burden when faced with the
defense that unseaworthiness, if it existed, was caused solely by the employer.
43. Sieracki was vigorously criticized in the dissenting opinion, 328 U.S. at 103-08,
and has been since. See Pope & Talbott, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 422-26 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion) ; Tetreault, supra note 1, at 382; Ambler, Seamen Are "Wards of the
Admiralty" but Longshoremen Are Now More Privileged, 29 WASH. L. REv. 243, 257
(1954) ; Dickinson & Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 36 CALnF. L. Rav. 169, 191. (1948) ; Notes, 102 U. PA. L. REX. 402, 404
(1954) ; 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1946); 45 CoLum. L. Rav. 957 (1945); 59 HARV. L. Rv.
127 (1945). The Washington representative of the International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union recently expressed disapproval of Sieracki because it undermined
the original quid pro quo of the act. Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee on Bills
Relating to the Longshorenwn's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Third Party
Liability) of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 97-99
(1956). Seamen, moreover, are expressly excluded from the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1952), and are
not included in any other compensation plan. RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY § 39 (1939).
44. Ambler, supra note 43, at 257; The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REv.
83, 150.
45. A common-law cause of action may be abolished by statute to effect a proper
legislative end. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) ; Martin v. Pittsburg & L.E.
R.R., 203 U.S. 284, 295 (1906) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
H.R. 111.13 and 11119, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), identical bills, proposed the rejec-
tion of Sieracki, but were unfortunately coupled with provisos which removed third-party
suits arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act from
the "saving to suitors' clause' of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1952), and established contributory negligence as an absolute defense in dero-
gation of the admiralty rule of comparative negligence. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14
(1890). See also Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243 (1942) (admiralty
rights enforced by common-law courts). These propositions, in addition to encroaching
unjustifiably upon longshoremen's and harbor workers' time-honored prerogatives, have
been attacked as arbitrary classifications unconstitutional under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Hearings, sufra note 43, at 17-19. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ; Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 338 (1943) ; Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584-85 (1937).
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rationale to pinch the employer's statutory immunity would be diminished.
Shipowners would not be liable to employees unless negligent. Employers
would be liable to negligent shipowners on an implied indemnity theory only
if, as in Ryan, the negligence of the shipowner were merely the failure to dis-
cover and correct the consequences of the employer's improper performance. 46
Congressional opposition to higher compensation levels indirectly blocks what
seems the most desirable path to a satisfactory balance: the inclusion of ship-
owners within the compensation system of the act.47 Under such a plan owners,
presently liable without fault for the unseaworthiness of their ships, would
receive a fixed limit on liability. Employers' immunity from damages under
the act, intended to be complete, would become complete.48 Insurance in the
field could be written on a more rational basis; presently, under Ryan, em-
ployers are subject to risks of liability which defy safe actuarial computation.49
If shipowners were included within the compensation scheme of the act and
were required to share compensation payments with employers on a predeter-
mined basis, the liability of each could be easily insured. In addition, ship-
owners' resources, now subject to large damage suits by a few injured em-
ployees, would be available to increase, without hardship, the level of com-
pensation for all injured employees. It is doubtful, however, that such in-
creases would materialize. Many Congressmen viewed the levels of compensa-
46. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
47. Since Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932), held that the constitutionality
of the act depended upon the existence of the master and servant relation, a compensation
system which categorically includes shipowners might be thereby suspect. However, as
Justice Brandeis observed in his dissenting opinion, § 4(a) of the act itself provides for the
inclusion of the shipowner if the employer has not assured payment of compensation. Id.
at 83. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 49.22 (1952); Schwartz, Does the
Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163, 171 (1949) ; Note, 46
HARV. L. REv. 478, 488 (1933). At least five states, moreover, impose liability on the
general contractor to pay compensation to an employee of a subcontractor, even if the sub-
contractor is able to make payment. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7423 (1949) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.10 (Supp. 1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 44, § 503 (Supp. 1955); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1061 (Supp. 1955) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 63 (Supp. 1955). These pro-
visions have been held constitutional. Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 171 La. 199,
130 So. 1 (1930) ; Maryland v. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 Atl. 52 (1928). The
latter case upheld the Maryland statute because it required both the general contractor
and the employee of the subcontractor to yield some part of their respective rights. Despite
Sicracki shipowners have something left to yield. See Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines,
Inc., 238 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1956) (restricting scope of warranty of seaworthiness to
those engaged in activity traditionally considered ship's work). Cf. NLRB v. Hearst Pub-
lications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (approving application of National Labor Rela-
tions Act beyond the "immediate technical relation of employer and employee").
48. S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926).
49. Yancey, Shoreside Maritime Workers and The Warranty of Seaworthiness, 22
INs. COUNSEL J. 95, 98-99 (1955). The judgment against Ryan Stevedoring Co., for in-
stance, was $75,000, note 26 supra, and its insurance coverage only $25,000. Reply Brief
for Petitioner to that of the United States, as Amicus Curiae, p. 4 n.3, Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1.956).
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tion set in 1956 50 as low for longshoremen.51 But the act now regulates federal
compensation for nongovernment employees, 52 and it was said that a com-
promise therefore had to be made with the lower wage scales prevalent in the
District of Columbia.5 3 The objection does not seem particularly well taken,
however; even if longshoremen and workers in the District must be governed
by the same act,5 4 a percentage of the individual's wage rate is prescribed as
a maximum on compensation recovery, regardless of the absolute dollar maxi-
mum.55 Should, however, the congressional attitude toward higher benefits
change, the inclusion of shipowners in the compensation system would provide
the most rational balance to the diverse interests of workers, employers, and
shipowners.
In any event, the act should be amended to require compensation payments
during the prosecution of a third-party action by the employee and to eliminate
the assignment of that action to the employer after a formal award. 0 Em-
ployees, at present dependent upon inadequate compensation," should at least
50. Pub. L. No. 803, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26, 1956).
51. 102 CONG. Rc. 11528, 11529, 11530, 11535, 11543 (daily ed. July 13, 1956). Com-
pensation benefits under the act have been criticized as generally inadequate. See REEDE,
ADEgUAcY OF WORKMIEN'S COMPENSATION 66, 67, 85, 89 (1947) ; Bean, Choice of Remedies
by Injured 3faritime Workers, 1 NACCA L.J. 74, 77 (1948).
52. Act of May 17, 1928, c. 612, 45 STAT. 600 (employees in the District of Colum-
bia) ; 55 STAT. 622 (1941), 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (1952) (employees at military bases outside
the United States) ; 56 STAT. 1031 (1942), 42 U.S.C. § 1702 (1952) (workers hired by
government contractors performing outside the United States).
53. 102 CONG. REc. 1.1528 (daily ed. July 13, 1956).
54. See debate, id. at 1.1532-43.
55. 44 STAT. 1427 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1952).
56. A similar proposal, an adaptation of N.Y. WoRmaEN's ComP. LAW § 29, was
made in H.R. 5357, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). According to this bill, however, if the
employer sued, the employee would receive only two-thirds of the excess over compen-
sation and costs of recovery gained by the employer. The bill's proponents justify the
employer's retention of the remainder as a needed incentive to vigorous prosecution of the
claim and, necessarily in the alternative, as a limit on the employer's attorney's fees.
Hearings, supra note 43, at 13, 19, 46, 47. The limitation of attorney's fees rationale en-
visages no enrichment of the employer, but rests upon a misapprehension of New York
law, that the employer's attorney's fees are not deducted prior to the determination of the
amount of excess available for distribution. Id. at 46. New York law would seem to be
contrary. Lappin v. National Container Corp., 179 Misc. 109, 112, 37 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803
(Sup. Ct. 1942). It would seem also that adequate incentive is p rovided the employer by
permitting him to recover his compensation outlay. See Hearings, supra note 43, at 44.
Only two states allow the employer more. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENsATION § 74.31
(1952). And to permit the employer to retain one-third of the excess would present the
anomalous possibility of a tortfeasor materially profiting by his own negligence when the
employer and shipowner were joint tortfeasors.
For other variations of the employee-priority type assignment statute see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.39(4) (Supp. 1955) (assignment if employee fails to bring suit for one year);
ILL. AxN. STAT. c. 48, § 138.5 (Supp. 1956) (assignment if employee fails to bring suit
prior to three months before action barred by statute of limitations).
57. See note 51 supra.
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have full opportunity to take advantage of available remedies against third-
party tortfeasors. 5 This amendment would end the employer's opportunity to
gain control of the third-party action by controverting the employee's com-
pensation claim. Moreover, employees proceeding against third parties would
be subsidized by deserved compensation, rather than by fortuitous employer
beneficence5 9 To preclude the employee's double recovery and to preserve the
employer's prerogative of reimbursement the act should also be amended to
give to the employer a lien on the proceeds of any third-party recovery to the
extent of the total amount of compensation awarded, provided, or estimated.
In order to permit the employer to recoup his costs and compensation pay-
ments should the employee be unwilling to prosecute, the third-party action
should vest in the employer within a fixed, but relatively lengthy, period after
compensation commences.60 These changes, enacted without concurrent rejec-
tion of Sieracki or the inclusion of shipowners within the statutory compen-
sation scheme, admittedly would leave employers defenseless against the full
effect of Ryan. This seems preferable, however, to the present adjustment of
liability between shipowners and employers which, without providing increased
compensation benefits, severely curtails injured employees' statutory rights to
hold third parties liable in damages.
58. Should shipowners be included within the compensation system of the act, this
amendment would enable employees to prosecute other third-party tortfeasors without being
subject to the disabilities inherent in the present act.
59. See note 29 supra.
60. The period is six months in New York. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 29.
See also statutes cited note 56 supra.
19571
